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A GENERAL THEORY FOR MEASURING SELLER'S 
DAMAGES FOR TOTAL BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Robert ]. Harris* 
T HE ordinary remedy for breach of contract is the award of expectation damages,1 measured so that the award, plus that 
part of defendant's performance which plaintiff received, will give 
plaintiff the economic equivalent2 of the status he would have en-
joyed had he and defendant performed the contract as promised.3 
I£ defendant's breach is serious4 and plaintiff's duty to perform 
was conditioned upon defendant's proper performance,5 the 
breach not only entitles plaintiff to sue for expectation damages, 
it also gives him the legal power to refuse to render the balance 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the extensive assistance of Kenneth Graham, 
University of Michigan Law School, '62. 
1 This article is concerned with expectation damages-those fashioned to give 
plaintiff as good a status as he would have enjoyed had the contract been fully per-
formed by all parties. This is the normal measure of damages in almost all situations. 
McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 137 (1935). Breach of a promise to repay money and, in some 
states, a good faith failure to keep a promise to deliver good title to land give rise to 
damages which are less than expectation damages. McCORJIUCK, DAMAGES § 178 (1935). 
Where plaintiff cannot prove his expectation damages with certainty, he is usually 
permitted to recover his expenditures made in reliance on the contract. See discussion 
in 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1035 (1951) ; Fuller&: Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936). A total breach which results in unjust enrichment of 
the breaching party at the expense of the plaintiff normally is the occasion for a 
restitution suit. 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1104 (1951), unless the breach has given rise to a 
debt. Id., § 1110. 
Although the courts often tend to blur the distinction between these three, the author 
regards them as distinct remedies, and the present article is confined to situations wliere 
the court is pursuing the expectation damage remedy. 
2 Generally there is no recovery for harm to psychic interest. See 5 CORBIN, CoN1"RACTS 
§ 1076 (1951) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 145 (1935); 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 341 
(1932) ; Annots., 84 A.L.R. 1345 (1933) , 23 A.L.R. 372 (1923) • 
3 The goal of restoring plaintiff to this status is subordinated to several other policies, as 
indicated on pp. 583•84 infra. But if none of these overriding policies is present, plaintiff's 
expectation interest is vindicated completely. See Atlas Trading Corp. v. S. H. Grossman, 
Inc., 169 F.2d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1948); Silberstein v. Duluth News-Tribune Co., 68 Minn. 
430, 71 N.W. 622 (1897); Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489 (1858); cf. Jones v. Van Patten, 3 
Ind. 107 (1851). See generally 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 270 (1937); 5 COR-
BIN, CONTRACTS§ 992 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES§ 137 (1935); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 
§ 329, comment a (1932) ; 1 SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES 25 (9th ed. 1912) • 
4 See generally 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 946 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 142, at 
582 (1935); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 313 (1) (1932) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1290 
(1931). 
15 E.g., Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 17 (1900); Carlson v. Doran, 252 Minn. 449, 90 
N.W.2d 323 (1958); Nichols v. Scranton Steel Co., 137 N.Y. 471, 33 N.E. 561 (1893). See 
also 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 637 (1960); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1329 (1931). 
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of plaintiff's promised performance.6 When plaintiff first exercises 
this power and then sues for expectation damages, the "savings" 
which the plaintiff enjoyed by exercise of the power must be taken 
into account in measuring damages.7 
What plaintiff saved upon breach is only the first of three ele-
ments that go into all formulae for measuring ordinary contract 
damages. These savings must be deducted from the second ele-
ment, the value to plaintiff of the difference between what de-
fendant promised to do and what defendant in fact did to perform 
the contract-in other words, the unpaid balance of the price.8 
The last element in all expectation damage formulae often is 
called "consequential damages" or "incidental damages."9 The 
object of this element is to compensate plaintiff for his reason-
able post-breach expenditure made in an effort to mitigate the 
consequences of breach. This element arises only if plaintiff 
actually incurred such expenditure after breach and before trial. 
Plaintiff's obligation to mitigate damages,10 or, as it is some-
times called, the doctrine of avoidable consequences, 11 often re-
quires the plaintiff to exercise his power to stop work.12 Failure 
to exercise it is visited by oblique sanction:13 when the court 
6 E.g., Lowe v. Harwood, 139 Mass. 133 (1885); Lee v. Briggs, 99 Mich. 487, 58 N.W. 
477 (1894) ; Brazell v. Cohn, 32 Mont. 556, 81 Pac. 339 (1905) • 
7 Cf. Bullard v. Eames, 219 Mass. 49, 106 N.E. 584 (1914); Mays v. Hartman, 81 Ohio 
App. 408, 77 N.E.2d 93 (1947). See also 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1038 (1951); McCORMICK, 
DAMAGES § 143 (1935); REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 335 (1932), 
8 Frequently judges, commentators, and draftsmen of statutes describe this element 
elliptically, referring to it as "the contract price," rather than "the unpaid balance of the 
contract price." E.g., the Uniform Sales Act (§ 64) provides that "the measure of damages 
is . • • the difference between the contract price and the market or current price • • • ." 
The decided cases, however, make it clear that the thought, amplified, is the unpaid 
balance of the contract price. See, e.g., Bradford Novelty Co. v. Technomatic, Inc., 
142 Conn. 166, II2 A.2d 214 (1955); Sal's Furniture Co. v. Peterson, 86 R.I. 203, 133 A.2d 
770 (1957). 
9 See Development Co. of America v. King, 170 Fed. 923 (2d Cir. 1909); UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CooE § 2-710; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1044 (1951); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 171 
(1933) • But see SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES, ch. 3 (1st ed. 1847) • 
10 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1039 (1951) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 33-42 (1935); 
REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 336 (1932) ; 1 SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES 385 (9th ed. 1912) • 
11 See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1039 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 33 (1935); 1 
SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES § 203 (9th ed. 1912) • 
12 E.g., Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929); Heaver 
v. Lanahan, 74 Md. 493, 22 Atl. 263 (1891); Wigent v. Marrs, 130 Mich. 609, 90 N.W. 
423 (1902); Clark v. Marsiglia, l Denio 317 (N.Y. 1845). 
13 This fact is often referred to as a "duty to mitigate." This is a misnomer. See 
Rock v. Vandine, 106 Kan. 588, 189 Pac. 157 (1920) ; McClelland v. Climax Hosiery 
Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605 (1930) (Cardozo, Ch.J., concurring); 5 CORBIN, 
CONTRACTS § 1039, at 205 (1951) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 33, at 128 (1935); 1 SEDGEWICK, 
DAMAGES § 202 (9th ed. 1912) ; Annot., 81 A.L.R. 282 (1932) • 
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comes to measure plaintiff's damages it will treat him as though 
he had exercised the power and stopped work immediately upon 
notice of breach. Thus plaintiff's actual or potential savings14 
upon exercise of this power are an important part of damage meas-
urement both in cases where plaintiff exercised the power and in 
cases where he should have done so, but failed to do it. 
This article is concerned with the legal rules which should 
govern the process of valuing what plaintiff saved by exercising 
his power to stop further performance upon notice of defendant's 
serious breach. Where plaintiff is a "buyer" (whether he buys 
land, services, personalty, or the temporary use of some kind of 
property), and he was to pay the price in dollars,15 few difficulties 
arise in valuing his saved performance. But if he was a "seller" 
of any of those commodities, valuation is hard. Thus our inquiry 
is chiefly concerned with cases in which plaintiff is a "seller," not 
a "buyer."16 
Valuation-the process of translating something into a quan-
tity of dollars-usually gets little direct discussion in the reported 
opinions concerned with measurement of contract damages.17 The 
rules governing it must be inferred from the results affirmed or 
reversed and from the cryptic clues afforded by elliptical general-
izations. An example of the latter is the Uniform Sales Act's fa-
miliar codification of the common-law rule: 
"Section 64. Action for damages for non-acceptance of goods.-
" (3) Where there is an available market for the goods in 
question, the measure of damages is, in the absence of special 
circumstances showing proximate damage of a greater 
amount, the difference between the contract price and the 
market or current price at the time or times when the goods 
ought to have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for ac-
ceptance, then at the time of the refusal to accept." 
14 If he mitigates, his savings are actual; if he should have, they are potential. 
15 The same valuation problems exist if the plaintiff was a buyer who agreed to pay 
all or part of the price in something other than dollars. 
16 This article is concerned with valuation of what plaintiff saved by virtue of 
defendant's total breach. It is rare that valuation problems are presented in cases where 
plaintiff's performance was to be a money payment-that is, in cases where plaintiff is a 
"buyer." Consequently, the title of the article refers to "seller's damages." But the 
theoretical considerations apply whether plaintiff was to pay money and defendant do 
something else ("plaintiff is a buyer'') , plaintiff was to do something else and defendant 
was to pay money ("plaintiff is a seller'') , or both parties were to do something other 
than pay money (contract of exchange) • 
17 See I BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 277 (1937). 
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Here the legislature is saying that plaintiff-seller's savings should 
be valued by reference to the price the rejected goods would fetch 
at the nearest commodity exchange, 18 or if the goods are not of a 
sort sold at such an exchange, by reference to the highest price the 
seller could obtain for them by reasonable efforts at reselling 
them.19 This much meaning is locked in the term "market or 
current price." 
The Restatement of Contracts, section 346 (2) (a), states the 
familiar measure of damages where plaintiff is a building contrac-
tor and defendant-owner committed a total breach of the contract: 
"the entire contract price and compensation for unavoidable 
special harm that the defendant had reason to foresee when 
the contract was made, less installments already paid and the 
cost of completion that the builder can reasonably save by 
not completing the work .... " 
Here plaintiff's savings by exercise of his power to stop further 
performance are to be valued by reference to what it should have 
cost plaintiff to complete performance. 
In Corbin on Contracts20 a formula appears for use in cases 
where plaintiff is an employee who is wrongfully discharged before 
he substantially completed the service of a particular period 
for which a definite wage installment was the agreed equivalent. 
The measure is 
"the total amount of the unpaid wages that were promised to 
him for his service, less the amount that he can earn by mak-
ing reasonable effort to obtain similar service under another 
employer." 
Here the employee's savings upon exercise of the power are valued 
by reference to the price his services would have fetched had he 
used reasonable efforts to resell them:21 they are valued by refer-
ence to the labor market in which he could resell them. 
18 E.g., Bogren v. Conn, 224 Iowa 1031, 278 N.W. 289 (1938); Garfield&: Proctor Coal 
Co. v. New York, N.H. &: H. Ry., 248 Mass. 502, 143 N.E. 312 (1924); Buyer v. Mercury 
Technical Cloth&: Felt Corp., 301 N.Y. 74, 92 N.E.2d 896 (1950); Rees v. R. A. Bowers 
Co., 280 Pa. 474, 124 Atl. 653 (1924) • 
19 See Churchhill Grain and Seed Co. v. Newton, 88 Conn. 130, 89 Atl. 1121 (1914) ; 
Babbitt v. Wides Motor Sales Corp., 17 Misc. 2d 889, 192 N.Y.S.2d 21 (Sup. Ct. 1959); 
Growers Exch. v. John A. Eck Co., 66 Utah 340, 242 Pac. 391 (1925). 
20 5 CORBIN, CONTRACfS § 1095, at 431 (1951). 
21 Ibid. 
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In Corbin's discussion of the seller's damages for breach by 
a buyer of goods the following passage appears: 
"If the seller is a manufacturer or producer of the subject of 
the sale, with capacity to produce enough such articles to sup-
ply all probable customers, the buyer's rejection does not 
make possible a second sale that the seller could not otherwise 
have made. Every new customer would have been supplied 
even if the buyer had kept the goods and performed his con-
tract. The same is true if the seller, though not himself a 
producer of the goods, is an intermediate dealer whose rela-
tions with a producer enable him to supply all obtainable cus-
tomers. In these cases, the buyer's breach does not make 
possible a new sale in which the profit lost by the buyer's 
breach would be replaced. Every new sale by the seller would 
have brought in a new profit. The only 'saving' that the 
buyer's breach makes possible in these cases is the 'cost' of 
producing or procuring the subject of the sale; the seller is 
enabled to make one new sale without incurring the cost of a 
second article of the kind. In order to put the seller in as 
good a position as that in which performance would have put 
him, he must now be awarded the contract price diminished 
only by his cost of procurement. Normally, this 'cost of pro-
curement' by an intermediate dealer is the 'wholesale price' 
to dealers, not the market value at retail, the difference being 
the dealer's profit."22 
The passage reflects the views of several other commentators as 
well,23 and its idea has been followed in a substantial group of 
cases involving "expansible" sellers of goods as plaintiff.24 Indeed, 
similar notions appear in many cases where the "expansible" seller-
plaintiff sells services, not goods.25 In all these cases what plaintiff 
saved is valued by reference to its cost to plaintiff, rather than the 
price at which he could resell it. 
2'.! Id. § 1100, at 449. 
23 See 1 BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 304 (1937); McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 41 
(1935); Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 993 (1956); Note, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1937). 
24 E.g., Tedford Auto Co. v. Hom, 113 Ark. 310, 168 S.W. 133 (1914) (by impli· 
cation); Willhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634 (1936); 
Cameron v. White, 74 Wis. 425, 43 N.W. 155 (1889) • See also Mossy Motors v. McRed-
mond, 12 So. 2d 719 (La. 1943) . See pp. 599-604 infra. Annot., 24 A.L.R. 2d 1008 (1952). 
25 See Van Winkle v. Satterfield, 58 Ark. 617, 25 S.W. 1113 (1894); Nucholls v. 
College of Physicians & Surgeons, 7 Cal. App. 233, 94 Pac. 81 (1907); Sullivan v. McMillan, 
37 Fla. 134, 19 So. 340 (1896) ; Mount Pleasant Stable Co. v. Steinberg, 238 Mass. 567, 131 
N.E. 295 (1921); Annot., 15 A.L.R. 751 (1921). 
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Thus it would appear that in some situations plaintiff's savings 
are to be valued by reference to his costs, and in some situations 
they are to be valued by reference to resale price. Moreover, it 
appears that even where plaintiff's savings are valued by reference 
to their resale price there is a split as to who must prove the resale 
price, some cases holding that defendant has the burden of proving 
that price,26 while other cases indicate that plaintiff has the bur-
den.27 Thus there are at least three, not two, rules competing in 
the cases involving valuation of what plaintiff saved by defendant's 
breach. Despite this diversity of basic approaches there is very 
little effort made in the reported opinions28 or the commentators' 
writings29 to explain the type of case in which each valuation 
approach is appropriate. 
This article attempts to state some broad rules which the 
author thinks should govern the process of valuing what plaintiff 
saved by exercise of his power to avoid further performance.30 The 
purpose of this article is to demonstrate that there are general 
principles and considerations which make possible a set of rules 
for valuing what plaintiff saved regardless of the type of contract 
involved. The rules stated herein purport to apply whether plain-
tiff is seller or buyer,31 and whatever the type of commodity being 
26 E.g., Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., 353 Mich. 402, 91 N.W.2d 288 (1958); 
McMullan v. Dickinson, 60 Minn. 156, 62 N.W. 120 (1895); Manhatten Overseas Co. v. 
Camden County Beverage Co., 125 N.J.L. 239, 15 A.2d 217 (1940); Howard v. Daly, 61 
N.Y. 362 (1875). See also Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 968 (1951). 
21 E.g., Frankel v. Foreman & Clark, 33 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1929); Obrecht v. Crawford, 
175 Md. 385, 2 A.2d 1 (1938); McColl v. Wardowski, 280 Mich. 374, 273 N.W. 736 (1937); 
Derami, Inc. v. John B. Cabot, Inc., 273 App. Div. 717, 79 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1948). See also 
Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1336 (1941) . 
28 See 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 276-77 (1937). 
29 Among the best of the commentators writing on the variant approaches to valuing 
what plaintiff saved thanks to defendant's total breach are 1 BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION OF 
PROPERTY (1937) i 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1004 (1951) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 43-49 
(1935); Matthews, The Valuation of Property in the Early Common Law, 35 HARv. L. 
REv. 15 (1921) . 
so Subsequent articles will examine the case law in selected jurisdictions and under 
the Uniform Sales Act to determine the extent to which the results of decided cases 
correlate with the author's ideas of policy. 
31 The conventional categorization of damage rules distinguishes between seller as a 
plaintiff and buyer as a plaintiff. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-708; UNIFORM 
SALES Ac:r § 64; or the table of contents of any treatise or digest. This often leads to 
creation of another category or categories to embrace situations involving breach of a 
contract of exchange, such as a typical manufacturer-distributor arrangement. See Nelson 
Equip. Co. v. Harner, 191 Ore. 359, 230 P.2d 188 (1951); Annot., 89 A.L.R. 252 (1934) • 
. Cf. 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAc:rs § 1025 (1951); 1 SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES § 193 (a) (9th ed. 1912). 
Although they rarely recognize the source of their difficulty clearly, courts often have 
heavy going in cases involving contracts of exchange because they are used to buyer/seller 
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exchanged31a or the character of plaintiff's enterprise,32 or the pre-
cise nature of defendant's serious breach.33 
The author's "should" is derived in part from what he thinks 
are well-established notions that apply across the board in all cases 
involving measurement of expectation damages for breach of con-
tract: (1) the goal is expectation-compensation, subject to the 
other policies listed below; (2) there is no recovery for items of 
loss unforeseeable to defendant at the time of contracting;34 (3) 
there is no recovery for those consequences of breach which plain-
tiff could have avoided by reasonable self-protective care;35 (4) 
all plaintiff's gains causally related to the breach must be taken 
into account in measuring damages, whether or not plaintiff was 
obligated by the mitigation notion to incur the risks that were 
involved in achieving the particular gain;36 (5) all items of loss 
not proved with sufficient certainty shall be ignored in damage 
measurement;37 (6) all plaintiff's expenditures in reasonable ef-
type of categorization of plaintiffs. See Frederick v. Hillebrand, 199 Mich. 333, 165 
N.W. 810 (1917) (ignoring the problem). Compare Poppenberg v. R. M. Owen & Co., 
84 Misc. 126, 146 N.Y.S. 478 (Sup. Ct. 1914) with A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 App. Div. 
533, 300 N.Y. Supp. 226 (1937). See note 16 supra. 
31a Conventionally, damage measurement formulae are particularized according to 
whether they involve goods, land, services, etc. 
32 See, e.g., Renner Co. v. McNeff Bros., 102 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1939) (business requires 
advance contracts) ; Patty v. Berryman, 95 Cal. App. 2d 159, 212 P .2d 937 (1949) ("middle-
man"); Nelson Equip. Co. v. Harner, supra note 31 ("dealer'); Annots., 24 A.L.R. 2d 
1008 (1952); 32 A.L.R. 209 (1924) ; 41 A.L.R. 1175 (1926) . 
33 For use of this sort of distinction, see Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900); McGrew 
v. Ide Estate Inv. Co., 106 Kan. 348, 187 Pac. 887 (1920) ; Forest Prods. Co. v. Dant &: 
Russell, Inc., 117 Ore. 637, 244 Pac. 531 (1926); Annot., 44 A.L.R. 215 (1926). 
34 The foreseeability doctrine rarely comes into issue in cases where plaintiff is a 
seller. The vast bulk of cases in which the doctrine has significance involve efforts to 
value "item #2": the difference between what defendant promised to do and what he in 
fact did. And "item #2" only presents difficult valuation choices if defendant's performance 
is something other than the payment of money-that is, if defendant is a buyer. See 
generally Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903); Dally v. Isaacson, 
40 Wash. 2d 574, 245 P .2d 200 (1952) ; Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 
145 (1854); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1007 (1951) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 137•141 (1935); 
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 330 (1932} • 
35 See materials cited note 10 supra. 
36 See Pacific Odorite Corp. v. Gersh, 94 Cal. App. 2d 174, 210 P.2d 318 (1949); 
Griffin v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp., 132 Kan. 843, 297 Pac. 662 (1931); 5 CORBIN, 
CONTRACTS § 1041 (1951); McCORllIICK, DAMAGES § 160, at 630 (1935). See also text at 
p. 605 infra. 
37 Stephany v. Hunt Bros., 62 Cal. App. 638, 217 Pac. 797 (1923); Isbell v. Anderson 
Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N.W. 457 (1912); Schoenberg v. Forrest, 253 S.W .2d 331 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1020 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES 
§§ 25-32 (1935) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 331 (1) (1932) ; Annot., 78 A.L.R. 858 (1932) ; 
Note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1950). 
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forts to avoid the consequences of breach can be recovered, 
whether or not the effort ultimately proves successful.38 
By the time all these notions are heeded, the range of choice 
in the valuation process is much reduced. The question of choice 
is then resolved by reference to two notions: (1) the value being 
sought is value to the plaintiff;39 and (2) all remaining choices 
should be resolved in the interests of convenient trial administra-
tion. The latter notion requires that some attention be given to 
matters which are deeply entwined in the choice of valuation ap-
proach:40 the allocation of the burden of proof, the types of evi-
dence deemed sufficient to carry the burden, and the availability 
of flexible discovery devices. 
RULES FOR MEASUREMENT 
In fixing the value of plaintiff's unrendered performance, the 
initial choice is between valuing the savings as an "entity," or by 
reference to the individual components which would have gone 
into completing plaintiff's performance. The "entity" approach, 
which places emphasis on the possible or actual resale price of 
the commodity, rests on the assumption that plaintiff should have 
minimized his damages by completing his performance and resell-
ing it to another buyer. The components approach, which places 
emphasis on plaintiff's costs, rests on the assumption that the best 
way for plaintiff to minimize his damages was to stop work upon 
notice of breach. In the great majority of cases mitigation princi-
ples will require that the plaintiff stop work upon notice of breach, 
so that the typical valuation problem will involve an inquiry into 
the value of the components of plaintiff's performance which he 
was not required to render. 
38 Hartford City Paper Co. v. Enterprise Paper Co., 86 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1949); 
National Commodity Corp. v. American Fruit Growers, 45 Del. 169, 70 A.2d 28 (1949); 
Berquist v. N.J. Olsen Co., 165 Minn. 406, 206 N.W. 931 (1925); Lake County Pine 
Lumber Co. v. Underwood Lumber Co., 140 Ore. 19, 12 P.2d 324 (1932); 5 CoRBIN, 
CONTRACTS § 1044 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 42 (1935); REs'fATEMENT, CONTRACTS 
§ 336 (2) (1932) . 
39 See Continental Copper & Steel Industries v. Bloom, 139 Conn. 700, 96 A.2d 758 
(1953); Moline Furniture Works v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 587, 274 N.W. 338 
(1937) . Cf. Cody v. American Educational Co., 131 Ill. App. 240 (1907) . See also 1 
BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 271 (1937); McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 44, at 168 
(1935) ; 1 SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES § 251 (9th ed. 1912) ; 3 WII.LISTON, CONTRACTS § 1343 
(1931) • Cf. REs'fATEMENT, TORTS § 911 (1939) • 
40 See discussion at pages 588-92 infra. 
1962] MEASUREMENT OF SELLER'S DAMAGES 
I. PLAINTIFF'S SAVINGS VALUED INDIVIDUALLY 
A. Identification of Components 
585 
Identification of the components which were to have gone 
into plaintiff's performance during the time interval after defend-
ant's total breach necessitates inquiry into plaintiff's state of affairs 
at the moment of total breach.41 What he had on hand then and 
how he planned to assemble component parts of his performance 
not yet on hand are essential matters for accurate measurement. 
Five types of components of his as yet unrendered performance 
can be distinguished as of that moment in time: (1) overhead; 
(2) variable costs yet to be incurred; (3) real property on hand; 
(4) personal property on hand; and (5) plaintiff's non-delegable 
services yet to be rendered. Distinctions must be drawn among 
these categories because each should have its own appropriate val-
uation rules. 
"Overhead" in this context embraces all economic items that 
share two characteristics: (1) had plaintiff not exercised his power 
to stop work they would have been brought to bear, directly or 
indirectly, in the task of completing plaintiff's promised perform-
ance; (2) the item in question, whether or not plaintiff had it on 
hand at the moment he learned of breach, would have been used 
by plaintiff not only in completing his performance of this con-
tract, but also in the performance of others. "Overhead," as used 
here, includes such items as the plaintiff's insurance protection, 
his goodwill, the work time of his employees, his productive real 
property whether owned or leased, his machinery-in short, all 
assets whose cost of acquisition is regarded as fixed, not variable. 
It makes no difference whether an overhead item was on hand or 
yet to be acquired, at the moment of breach notice. 
"Variable costs yet to be incurred" differ from "overhead" in 
two obvious ways: (1) we now concentrate on items not yet on 
hand nor under contract to plaintiff at the moment of breach no-
tice, whereas the "overhead" category was indifferent to the mo-
41 The moment of notice of breach-in repudiation cases-or tbe moment when 
plaintiff elects to terminate-in otber total breach cases-is tbe critical moment for de-
termining what is to be measured. 'When that question has been resolved, and the court 
seeks to value property on hand by reference to its resale price, a separate and distinct 
problem of timing arises: as of what date shall resale value be measured? Resolution of tbe 
latter question is beyond the scope of tbe present article. See, e.g., McCORMICK, DAMAGES 
§ 48 (1935) ; Note, 37 MINN. L. REV. 215 (1953). 
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ment when plaintiff acquired the item in question; (2) we now 
concentrate exclusively on costs which are variable, not fixed. Only 
those items which are to be used only on the balance of the plain-
tiff-defendant contract come into this category. Obviously, diffi-
culty will be encountered in close cases in tracing the border-
line between overhead and variable costs yet to be incurred.42 
There will, of necessity, be similar difficulty in close cases in dis-
tinguishing variable costs yet to be incurred from real or personal 
property on hand.43 
"Real property on hand" includes all interests in real property 
which meet two tests: (1) had plaintiff completed his perform-
ance with defendant he would have transferred this interest in the 
real property; and (2) at the time of breach notice plaintiff owned 
this interest in the real property. It makes no difference for pres-
ent purposes whether the interest in question was a fee or some 
lesser estate in land or some incorporeal hereditament. The crit-
ical things are that plaintiff saved the interest thanks to breach and 
he had this interest on hand at the time of breach notice. 
The line between real property on hand and variable costs yet 
to be incurred may become gray in some cases.44 For example, if 
plaintiff was to convey land in fee- to defendant, and at the time 
of breach plaintiff owned it subject to a mortgage which was in 
default, probably plaintiff should be deemed to have the real prop-
erty on hand. .But if his only interest in the land at the moment 
of breach notice was his right to redeem it from the purchaser who 
bought it at the foreclosure sale, and plaintiff contracted to de-
liver the land in fee, plaintiff probably should be regarded as hav-
ing saved the variable cost yet to be incurred of redeeming the 
land from the foreclosure sale purchaser.45 Perhaps the question 
should turn on whether it is likely that a reasonable man in plain-
42 E.g., Rantoul Co. v. Claremont Paper Co., 196 Fed. 305 (1st Cir. 1912) ; Detroit 
Fireproofing Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., 190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916) ; Jessup &: Moore 
Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 297 Pa. 483, 147 Atl. 519 (1929). 
43 E.g., Dolly Parker Motors v. Stinson, 220 Ark. 28, 245 S.W.2d 820 (1952); Nestler v. 
Pure Silk Hosiery Mills, 242 Ill. App. 151 (1926) ; Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 
222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923); Hayes v. Durham, 194 App. Div. 848, 185 N.Y. Supp. 
691 (1921). 
44 E.g., Raycraft v. Northville-Six Mile Co., 358 Mich. 466, 100 N.W.2d 223 (1960); 
Roper v. Milbourn, 98 Neb. 466, 153 N.W. 557 (1915); McDaniel v. Daves, 139 Va. 178, 
123 S.E. 663 (1924) • 
45 Cf. Shurtleff v. Marcus Land & Inv. Co., 59 Cal. App. 520, 211 Pac. 244 (1922) • 
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tiff's shoes, upon notice of defendant's breach, would exercise the 
right to redeem anyway. 
"Personal property on hand" embraces both goods and choses 
in action. Of course in cases where plaintiff is a bailor, not seller, 
it is the use of the property for the length of time fixed in the con-
tract which is the item to be valued. A distinction is drawn be-
tween personal property on hand and real property on hand solely 
because different rules of valuation govern them. The difference 
in these valuation rules stems from the fact that in goods cases 
plaintiff's alternative remedies to the damage remedy are different 
from those in the realty cases. This will be elaborated subse-
quently. 46 
"Non-delegable services yet to be rendered" embraces the 
saved "time" of persons who were to perform all or part of plain-
tiff's side of the bargain and whose identity is an essential part of 
plaintiff's promised performance. If plaintiff is an individual, and 
his services were so "personal" that delegation of them to another 
without defendant's consent would have justified defendant's 
refusal to perform further,47 plaintiff's services are non-delegable. 
If plaintiff is a partnership, corporation, unincorporated associa-
tion or the like, and the contract required all or part of plaintiff's 
performance being rendered by a specific person or persons,48 the 
services of such persons are "non-delegable" as the term is here 
used. 
These five categories should embrace all items that would have 
gone into the process of completion of plaintiff's promised per-
formance. In some cases all items saved will fall into a single 
category;49 in other cases items will fall into more than one cate-
gory.50 In any event categorization must precede application of 
the rules of valuation. 
46 See text at pp. 595-97 infra. 
47 New England Cabinet Works v. Morris, 226 Mass. 246, 115 N.E. 315 (1917); Corson 
v. Lewis, 77 Neb. 446, 109 N.W. 735 (1906); Folquet v. Woodburn Pub. Schools, 146 Ore. 
339, 29 P.2d 554 (1934); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 865 (1951). 
48 See Wetherell Bros. v. United States Steel Co., 200 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1952); Wooster 
v. Crane&: Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 22, 66 Atl. 1093 (1907); Johnson v. Vickers, 139 Wis. 145, 120 
N.W. 837 (1909) . 
40 E.g., St. John v. Richard, 272 Mich. 670, 262 N.W. 437 (1935) (real property on 
hand); Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N.W. 252 (1924) (personal property on 
hand) ; Gallino v. Boland, 221 Mich. 502, 191 N.W. 222 (1922) (non-delegable personal 
services) ; Burrel v. New York &: Saginaw Solar Salt Co., 14 Mich. 34 (1865) (variable 
costs). 
50 Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Foster Boat Co., 141 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1944) ; 
588 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
B. Overhead Saved 
I. Valuation Problems 
[Vol. 60 
Were there neither problems of proof nor of accounting the 
process of valuing plaintiff's saved overhead might exhibit the 
following sequence: (1) listing of all non-variable items that 
would go into completion of plaintiff's performance, directly or 
indirectly; (2) elimination by the court of those items on the list 
that contribute only indirectly, since breach does not "release" 
them for other profitable re-employment by plaintiff; (3) elimi-
nation of those items remaining which plaintiff after breach nei-
ther re-employed nor was obligated by mitigation to re-employ; 
(4) determination of the percentage of the remaining items on 
the list that should be allocated to the performance of the balance 
of plaintiff's contract with defendant; (5) valuation of each of 
these remaining items at cost to plaintiff and multiplication of the 
cost of each by the percentage of it that should be allocated to the 
balance of this contract; (6) totaling the figures thus determined 
for each remaining item to get the value to plaintiff of the over-
head saved. 
2. Burden of Proof and Presumptions 
Of course the process just described bears little resemblance to 
reality, where there are problems of proofli1 and of accounting.52 
Step number three above, which requires a determination of 
whether the plaintiff either did or should have re-employed the 
overhead items released by breach, is almost always incapable of 
proof. Whichever party has the burden of proof usually is doomed 
to fail to carry it on this issue. ("Burden of proof" is used here in 
the sense of the burden of going forward.) Accordingly, the court 
must either assume (a) that all released assets were or should have 
been re-employed by plaintiff or (b) that no released assets were 
or should have been thus re-employed. The latter assumption 
McConnell v. Corona City Water Co., 149 Cal. 60, 85 Pac. 929 (1906); Capital Paper 
Box, Inc. v. Belding Hosiery Mills, Inc., 350 Ill. App. 68, 111 N.E.2d 858 (1953); Callender 
v. Myers Regulator Co., 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930). 
51 See McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 29 (1935) ; Note, 28 CoLUM. L. REv. 76 (1928) ; Note, 
46 HARV. L. REv. 696 (1933); Note, 17 MINN. L. REV. 194 (1932). 
112 See Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 992 (1956). 
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means, m effect, that the court never treats plaintiff as having 
saved any overhead. 03 
If the court engages in the latter assumption it creates the peril 
that in some cases-those in which plaintiff does in fact re-employ 
his overhead items-plaintiff will be overcompensated. The oppo-
site assumption creates a peril that in cases where plaintiff does not 
and cannot re-employ released overhead items he will be under-
compensated. Neither prospect is happy, and the amount at stake 
can be large if a large part of plaintiff's costs are fixed. 
The best course is to create a rebuttable presumption, either 
that all overhead items have been re-employed, or, on the con-
trary, that none have been re-employed. The latter presumption 
would have the virtue of simplifying trial in those cases where no 
effort at rebuttal is made. 
In choosing between the two possible presumptions, the court 
faces a conflict of policy goals. Anything which tends toward 
under-compensation has the virtue of helping to split the loss 
between the parties. If the court assumes there is social utility 
in splitting the loss54-so that each party has less loss to absorb 
and/ or distribute-this argues for presuming that all overhead 
items have been re-employed. 
But if the court assumes there is social utility in deterring 
future breaches of this sort55 and in encouraging reliance upon 
promises of this sort,56 then undercompensation is an evil. The 
court which embraces these as policy goals of contract law will find 
its damage law already too undercompensatory, thanks to the "cer-
tainty" requirement,57 the non-recovery of expenses of litigation,58 
and the notion that recovery is limited to harm to plaintiff's eco-
53 Compare McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 165, at 644 (1935) with Note, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 
563 (1930). 
M See SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES 38 (1st ed. 1847) ; On the Measure of Damages Ex Contractu, 
3 U. PA. L. REv. 513 (1855); Comment, Loss Splitting in Contract Litigation, 18 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 153 (1950) . 
56 See KEssLER & SHARP, CASES ON CoNTRACTS 555 (1953); Fuller & Perdue, The Reli-
ance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61 (1936); Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 
1360, 1366 (1948) ; cf. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 738 (1931) • 
56 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 55, at 72; Llewellyn, supra note 55, at 725 n.47. 
57 See text at note 37 supra. 
58 See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS§ 1037 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 71 (1935); REs:rATE-
lllENT, CONTRACTS§ 334 (1932); Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940); Note, 21 VA. L. REv. 
920 (1935). 
590 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
nomic interests. 511 Such a court should presume that no overhead 
items have been re-employed. 
To treat loss-splitting between plaintiff and defendant as a 
social goal of contract law seems dubious inasmuch as the 
parties usually regard the contract as a device for shifting the risk 
of loss. 60 In situations in which the parties never contemplated the 
risk of this kind of loss at the time they contracted, the contract, of 
course, is not intended by them as a device for shifting the loss. 
In such cases, non-consensual allocation of the loss is necessary, 
and the judges are well-advised to split such losses between the 
parties to minimize the peril that either of them will be destroyed 
by the entire loss.61 The doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale62 per-
forms this function in contract litigation, much as the doctrine of 
proximate cause performs it in tort litigation.63 But where the risk 
of this kind of loss was contemplated at the time of contracting and 
the economic function of the contract was to shift this risk from 
plaintiff to defendant, the courts shoulq not foster doctrines which 
prevent a substantial part of the risk from being thus shifted. 
Courts which nevertheless choose to presume that all plaintiff's 
released overhead items were or should have been re-employed on 
other contracts must then face the problems involved in measuring 
saved overhead. In view of the manifold problems of proof and 
accounting that such cases can present, little in the way of "rules" 
seems desirable other than a requirement that the court handle 
each case ad hoc, with due appreciation of (a) the particular kinds 
of data which are available in each case and (b) the amount of 
money a~ stake. Obviously the court should permit some minor 
inaccuracy in theory if it permits counsel to make use of existing 
data, rather than requiring theoretical accuracy to the point where 
the only available evidence is inadmissible. Equally obvious is the 
idea that more precision should be demanded when larger sums 
are at stake. 
If saved overhead is to be measured, the burden of proving 
511 See materials cited note 2 supra. 
60 LLEWELLYN, CASES ON SALES 1 (1930). 
61 See authorities cited note 55 supra. 
62 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) . 
63 See generally 1 BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 287 (1937); GREEN, JUDGE AND 
JURY, ch. 2 (1930) ; GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, ch. 6 (1927) ; McCORMICK, 
DAMAGES § 32 (1935); Miller, Damages, Responsibility, and Loss of Profits, 17 MARQ. L. 
REv. 3 (1932) . 
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the items in question and the amount of each item should be placed 
on defendant, at least if the state has broad discovery procedures 
which defendant can use to obtain information in plaintiff's con-
trol.64 It is true that even with the aid of discovery devices de-
fendant will have poorer access to the data than plaintiff, and it is 
also true that in cases where small sums are involved discovery may 
not be feasible. But admitting these disadvantages it is still better 
to saddle defendant with the burden of proof than to place it on 
plaintiff, since plaintiff has no incentive to prove his items of saved 
overhead or to prove any item to be large. It is in his interest 
that there be fewer items of overhead saved and that each item be 
as small as possible. 65 If defendant has the burden of proof the 
court can force defendant to carry the burden by (a) assuming 
no items of overhead to exist except those proved by defendant; 
and (b) assuming no item is larger than defendant proves it to be. 
If plaintiff has the burden the court cannot compel it to be carried 
by such assumptions when the burden falls; plaintiff would like 
nothing better than to see the burden fall in that event. 
In order to compel plaintiff to carry the burden, it would be 
necessary to give him this all-or-nothing proposition: if the court 
concludes that plaintiff failed to prove all items of overhead or 
that he understated any particular item of overhead he will be 
deemed to have failed to carry the burden of proof on the whole 
subject of damages.il6 His penalty is that he is not permitted to 
recover more than nominal damages.il7 The practical difficulties 
with this arrangement are enormous. For one thing, the court is 
hardly in a position to know whether plaintiff's evidence of saved 
overhead is incomplete.68 Moreover, plaintiff's failure to prove a 
64 In a state where very limited discovery is available the author can see little reason 
for preferring one resolution of the burden of proof over the other. Either way the court 
allocates the burden there is some peril of unfairness here. Cf. Bova v. Roanoke Oil Co., 
180 Va. 332, 23 S.E.2d 347 (1942) . But see Capital Paper Box, Inc. v. Belding Hosiery 
Mills, Inc., 350 Ill. App. 68, 111 N.E.2d 858 (1953). 
611 Cf. Demirjian v. Kurtis, 353 Mich. 619, 91 N.W .2d 841 (1958); Breding v. Cham-
plain Marine & Realty Co., 106 Vt. 288, 172 Atl. 625 (1934); Quist v. Zerr, 12 Wash. 2d 
21, 120 P.2d 539 (1941). 
66 E.g., C. L. Percival Co. v. Sea, 207 Iowa 245, 222 N.W. 886 (1929); Callender v. 
Myers Regulator Co., 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930) . 
67 See International Textbook Co. v. Schulte, 151 Mich. 149, 114 N.W. 1031 (1908); 
Crichfield-Loeffler, Inc. v. Taverna, 4 N.J. Misc. 310, 132 Atl. 494 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Buyer 
v. Mercury Technical Cloth & Felt Corp., 301 N.Y. 74, 92 N.E.2d 896 (1950) . 
68 E.g., Nesler v. Pure Silk Hosiery Mills, 242 Ill. App. 151 (1926); Nurmi v. Beardsley, 
284 Mich. 165, 278 N.W. 805 (1938); Nelson Equip. Co. v. Harner, 191 Ore. 359, 230 
P.2d 188 (1951). 
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single item or part of an item may not be due to such gross delin-
quency on his part that he should be visited by so severe a penalty. 
His failure may come from inability to locate evidence of a kind 
that can satisfy the certainty requirement69 or his erroneous theory 
as to the approach to valuation which would be taken.70 A court 
must indeed be fearful of the risk of possible overcompensation if 
it prefers to put the burden of proving saved overhead on plaintiff 
rather than defendant, especially where defendant has discovery 
devices available to help him carry the burden. 
C. Variable Costs Yet To Be Incurred 
These items should be valued at the sum plaintiff would have 
paid for them had he incurred these costs. Valuation requires 
proof of (a) which cost-items would have been purchased; and (b) 
the actual disbursement which would have been made for each 
item. Here, as in the previous section involving overhead, alloca-
tion of the burden of proof requires choice between the party with 
superior access to the evidence and the party who has the motive 
to bring the evidence forward. For all the reasons given in the 
prior section the burden of proof should be placed on the defend-
ant, at least in a state where defendant has adequate discovery 
tools at hand. 
D. Real Property on Hand 
I. Valuation Problems 
The court usually need not choose between valuing the realty 
by replacement cost or valuing it by resale price: replacement and 
resale normally would take place in the same market. 
If the land was sold by plaintiff after breach and before trial, 
and if that sale was made under conditions that conform to plain-
tiff's obligation to mitigate by resale71 (i.e., it was not a sacrifice 
69 Cf. Busam Motor Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F. Supp. 790, 796 (S.D. Ohio 
1949); O'Hare v. Peacock Dairies, Inc., 26 Cal. App. 2d 345, 79 P.2d 433 (1938); Western 
Hatcheries v. Byrd, 218 S.W .2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). 
70 See Transit Bus Sales v. Kalamazoo Coaches, 145 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1944); Craw-
ford v. Cicotte, 186 Mich. 269, 152 N.W. 1065 (1916) ; Maxwell v. Schaefer, 381 Pa. 13, 112 
A.2d 69 (1955) • 
71 See McBrayer v. Cohen, 92 Ky. 479, 18 S.W. 123 (1892); Griswold v. Sabin, 51 
N.H. 167 (1871); Kempner v. Heidenheimer, 65 Tex. 587 (1886). 
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sale), the price received upon resale should fix the value to plain-
tiff of the saved realty.72 
Absent such an actual proper resale before trial, however, the 
court must seek to measure the potential resale price of the realty 
saved. Two questions are involved: (I) whether or not any will-
ing buyer could be found for the realty in question; and (2) if 
the first question is answered affirmatively, the price such a willing 
buyer would pay. Because land is a slow-moving commodity, with 
few buyers bidding on any particular tract on any particular day, 
it is most difficult to prove with certainty that a willing buyer 
could have been found for a particular tract unless the court 
presumes that every tract of land can be sold, given enough time 
for the seller to turn up a buyer. This presumption corresponds to 
reality better than would a contrary presumption, and should be 
indulged by the courts. 
There remains the question of what price a willing buyer 
would pay for the tract in question when he finally was found. 
Here the only feasible solution is to permit expert testimony based 
upon familiarity with the tract in question and the "market." In 
this context "market" means the mass of actual sales, and of offers 
made by buyers of other comparable tracts at comparable dates in 
a comparable geographic area. Of course the extrapolation from 
these other bids and sales grows more accurate as the other bids 
and sales grow more similar to the sale as to which the expert is 
giving his opinion. 
2. Burden of Proof 
The burden of proving the resale value of the realty saved 
should be placed on plaintiff. In cases where there has been a re-
sale before trial which conforms to mitigation standards plaintiff 
has the best access to this evidence.73 In cases where the proof 
must be by expert testimony of potential, not actual, resale value 
the parties have equal access to the evidence. But the defendant is 
placed under greater hardship than the plaintiff if he is given the 
72 E.g., Bouchard v. Orange, 177 Cal. App. 2d 521, 2 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1960); Gardner 
v. Armstrong, 111 Mo. 535 (1862) ; Stephenson v. Butts, 187 Pa. Super. 55, 142 A,2d 319 
(1958). 
73 If plaintiff proves a fair resale he breaks even on the entire transaction. If he 
suppresses the fact of resale in order to prove a lower potential resale value he runs the 
risk the court will find a higher potential resale value. 
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burden of proof: if plaintiff cannot or does not choose to adduce 
evidence of potential value (and run the risk of a jury finding of 
high resale value) he can seek his alternative expectation reme-
dies74-specific performance,75 non-judicial foreclosure of the sell-
er's lien76 or a suit for the whole price.77 But if defendant is sad-
dled with the burden of proof he has no alternatives. 
Where there is an actual proper resale before trial plaintiff 
should be permitted to recover as incidental damages the extra 
expenses entailed in the process of resale. Such expenses might 
include costs of advertising, paying broker's commission, taxes 
during the interval between the originally scheduled closing and 
the closing with the repurchaser, maintenance expenses during 
that interval, insurance during that interval, assessments during 
that interval, etc. Plaintiff should have the burden of proving both 
the size and the existence of these items since he has superior access 
to the evidence and the motive to bring it forth. 
Where there has been no actual resale, but the kind of resale 
required by mitigation would entail similar kinds of expenditure, 
plaintiff again should have the burden of proof. But as a practical 
matter plaintiff will rarely be able to prove with certainty the size 
or existence of these items, since the hypothetical resale in question 
is the somewhat hazy extrapolation of experts who are basing their 
opinion on fragmentary market data and some assumptions which 
are contrary to fact: that there is a willing buyer present on the date 
as of which the tract is to be valued.78 
74 Plaintiff also has the alternative (non-expectation) remedies of restitution and 
reliance damages. 
75 See Morgan v. Eaton, 59 Fla. 562, 52 So. 305 (1910) ; Staples v. Mullen, 196 Mass. 
132, 81 N.E. 877 (1907); Abbott v. Moldestad, 74 Minn. 293, 77 N.W. 227 (1898); 3 
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 11.68 (Casner ed. 1952); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1139 
(1951); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1443 (1931). 
76 See Cams v. Sexsmith, 193 Iowa 1080, 188 N.W. 657 (1922); Barnard v. Huff, 252 
Mich. 258, 233 N.W. 213 (1930); Vance v. Blakeley, 62 Ore. 326, 123 Pac. 390 (1912); 
3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.73 (Casner ed. 1952). 
77 See McCurry v. Pitner, 159 Ga. 807, 126 S.E. 781 (1925); Prichard v. Mulhall, 140 
Iowa 1, 118 N.W. 43 (1908); Bohlen v. Black, 237 Pa. 399, 85 Atl. 470 (1912); 3 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.77 (Casner ed. 1952); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1099 (1951); 3 
SEDGEWICK, DAMAGES § 1024 (9th ed. 1912) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1399 (1931). 
78 Cf. Thomthwaite v. Thomas, 71 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1954); Linde v. Ellis, 224 Ky. 649, 
6 S.W.2d 1089 (1928); Hubbard v. Epworth, 69 Mich. 92, 36 N.W. 801 (1888); Levy v. 
315 W. 79th St. Corp., 222 App. Div. 9, 225 N.Y. Supp. 218 (1927). 
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E. Personal Property on Hand19 
I. Valuation Problems in General 
595 
For the most part valuation of personal property on hand is 
conducted in the same fashion as valuation of realty on hand. It is 
the resale value of the personalty which the court seeks, 80 and if there 
was no actual resale before trial which meets mitigation standards, 
it is the potential resale price of the personalty saved which is the 
ultimate fact sought. As with realty two questions must be an-
swered: (1) could a willing buyer have been found, and (2) if he 
could have been found, what would he have been willing to pay? 
The presumption-appropriate in realty cases-that a willing 
buyer always can be found, is not appropriate in personalty cases. 
In real property cases potential resale value properly is proved by 
expert testimony as to what a hypothetical willing buyer would pay 
a hypothetical willing seller, for reasons already indicated. In cases 
involving goods or choses there is often available to the diligent 
plaintiff more reliable evidence of potential resale value-reports 
of prices actually paid or offers actually made by other buyers and 
sellers of this product. To encourage resort to such better evidence 
courts should reject efforts by the party with the burden of proof 
to prove potential resale value of goods and choses by reference to 
expert guesses as to the behavior of hypothetical willing buyers and 
sellers. Plaintiff, who will have the burden of proof, 81 if he would 
prove potential resale value at all, should be required to offer 
evidence of actual sales or offers of a sort comparable to his po-
tential resale--comparable in subject-matter, date, and locale.82 
79 The problems of double counting and impairment of total volume by resale of 
the plaintiff's saved performance are discussed in this section because they most frequently 
arise in cases where plaintiff is a seller of goods. However, they can arise in connection 
with other saved commodities, and in that event should be treated in a fashion analogous 
to that sketched here. 
80 There is often some confusion about this in the cases. E.g., H. W. Faulkner & Co. 
v. Centralia Bottling Works, 234 Ill. App. 9 (1924); Hausman v. Buchman, 189 App. Div. 
597, 179 N.Y. Supp. 26 (1919); Breding v. Champlain Marine & Realty Co., 106 Vt. 288, 
172 Atl. 625 (1934). But many cases which purport to be valuing the saved goods on 
hand at replacement cost or cost of acquisition seem to be giving a false rationale for a 
result which can better be justified on the more complex grounds suggested at pp. 599-604 
infra. 
81 See discussion at p. 599 infra. 
82 The line between cases where expert testimony as to willing buyers is and is not 
proper is best drawn at the familiar point where realty is separated from personalty. 
This is not because all realty is non-fungible and slow-moving and all personalty is the 
opposite, but because the correlation between these traits and these categories is sufficiently 
high that it seems better to use well-marked categories than to create new ones. 
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Since such proof is not always feasible for all kinds of goods and 
choses, there must be some route open for the plaintiff dealing in a 
commodity not sold at organized exchanges. Rather than permit 
such a plaintiff to resort to the loose real property valuation tech-
nique,83 the courts should reject his efforts to recover expectation 
damages, and require that he use some other remedy calculated to 
vindicate his expectation interest. 
The plaintiff's alternatives include (1) a suit at law for the 
price, with defendant getting title to the undelivered goods or 
choses which plaintiff holds as bailee;84 (2) an informal fore-
closure of plaintiff's lien on the undelivered goods or choses by 
non-judicial resale under specified conditions with deficiency 
judgment;85 (3) a suit for expectation damages, with plaintiff's 
savings valued by reference to the cost of replacing the goods in 
question.86 
All three alternatives have disadvantages which limit their use. 
The availability of the price remedy hinges on whether the saved 
personalty is goods or choses, whether or not title has passed, and 
whether the problem is governed by common law, Uniform Sales 
Act, or the Uniform Commercial Code. If choses are involved, the 
price remedy will be uniformly available if title has passed, 87 but 
in some states it is not available if title has not passed. 88 If goods 
are involved and the Uniform Commercial Code is in effect, the 
price remedy is rarely available,89 even if title has passed.90 If 
83 The plaintiff should not be permitted to sue for damages in a realty case if an 
alternative expectation remedy is available to him, such as specific performance, price, or 
foreclosure. He should not be encouraged to use a damage remedy which entails a specu-
lative type of proof of value. However, a rule forcing plaintiff to shun his legal remedy 
while there is an available equitable one runs directly contrary to the pro-jury maxims 
which have guided the accommodation of legal and equitable remedies. So giving jury 
trial its due, the plaintiff in realty cases cannot be deprived of his damage remedy except 
where he has a price remedy. In such cases plaintiff normally uses the price remedy. 
84 See Home Pattern Co. v. W.W. Mertz Co., 86 Conn. 494, 86 Atl. 19 (1913); Corwin 
v. Grays Harbor Washingtonian, Inc., 151 Wash. 585, 276 Pac. 902 (1929); Renne v. Volk, 
188 Wis. 508, 205 N.W. 385 (1926). 
85 See Howse v. Crumb, 143 Colo. 90, 352 P.2d 285 (1960) ; Urbansky v. Kutinsky, 86 
Conn. 22, 84 Atl. 317 (1912); Ore-Ida Potato Products, Inc. v. Larsen, 362 P.2d 384 (Idaho 
1961); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-706; UNIFORM SALES ACT§ 60; Annots., 119 A.L.R. 
1141 (1939), 44 A.L.R. 296 (1926). 
86 See Brunswick.-Balke-Collender Co. v. Wisconsin Mat Co., 24 F.2d 78 (7th Cir. 
1928); Breding v. Champlain Marine&: Realty Co., 106 Vt. 288, 172 Atl. 625 (1934); Popp 
v. Yuenger, 229 Wis. 189, 282 N.W. 55 (1938). 
87 WILLISTON, SALES § 561 (1924) • 
88 See DAWSON &: HARVEY, CAsES ON CONTRACTS 218 (1959) • 
89 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-709. 
90 The Code does not speak of "title," but of the "risk of loss." Even after the "risk 
1962] MEASUREMENT OF SELLER'S DAMAGES 597 
goods are involved and the Uniform Sales Act governs, the price 
remedy is available if title has passed,91 and in a limited class of 
cases where title has not passed.92 
The informal foreclosure procedure is available only to the 
limited extent permitted by statute,93 and presents problems of 
hindsight policing of the sale which plaintiff made.94 Unless the 
jury can be kept out of this process plaintiff faces substantial risks 
when he resells and hopes it will later meet official approval. 
The resort to a damage remedy with plaintiff's savings valued by 
his cost of replacing the goods has the disadvantage of measuring 
value to him by reference to behavior (replacement) which is not 
plausible for one in his position. It is essentially an arbitrary 
method of valuation in this context. 
It is dubious whether valuing plaintiff's saved goods on hand at 
replacement cost is any improvement over valuing them by what 
an expert says a willing buyer would pay. If replacement cost 
valuation is the only available alternative to expert guessing at 
resale value, perhaps the trial court should have discretion to 
permit use of expert testimony of resale value in a goods case. But 
where a price or informal foreclosure remedy was available to 
plaintiff and he failed to use it, the court should not accept the real 
property type of proof. 
The handling of incidental damages (where plaintiff actually 
resold properly before trial) or the extra expenses that would have 
been incurred in proper mitigation by resale (where plaintiff did 
not resell properly before trial) should be the same in personalty 
and realty cases with this exception: in personalty cases it should be 
possible more often for plaintiff to prove with certainty the extra 
expenses that would have attended proper resale. 
A peril of double counting arises, however, when plaintiff's 
efforts at mitigation prove successful, and they take the form of 
of loss" has passed to the buyer, seller has no price remedy unless the goods were ac• 
cepted, or they were lost or damaged shortly after the risk passed, or they were identified 
to the contract and cannot be resold feasibly. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-709 (1) • 
91 UNIFORM SALES Acr § 63 (1) • 
9:! UNIFORM SALES Acr § 63 (3) • 
93 UNIFORM SALES Acr § 60; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-706. 
94 Frankel v. Foreman&: Clark, 33 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1929); Lund v. Lachman, 29 Cal. 
App. 31, 154 Pac. 295 (1915); Zinsmeister v. Rock Island Canning Co., 145 Ky. 25, 139 
S.W. 1068 (1911); Rees v. R. A. Bowers Co., 280 Pa. 474, 124 Atl. 653 (1924) . 
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expenditure to accomplish a resale of the goods.95 For example, a 
plaintiff may be a seller of goods who, upon defendant-buyer's 
repudiation, incurs advertising expense in a successful effort to 
locate a new buyer for the goods. The advertising expense is 
properly included as an item of incidental damage unless it has 
already been taken into account in measuring accurately plaintiff's 
savings. This can occur if the value of what plaintiff saved was 
computed by deducting from the gross resale price of the goods 
the cost to plaintiff of advertising them. 
Another situation presenting the peril is this: in a situation 
similar to that just described, plaintiff avoids the expense he other-
wise would have incurred in shipping the goods from plaintiff's 
plant in Chicago to defendant's plant in Detroit. But his resale 
contract obligates him to deliver the goods to the resale purchaser 
in San Francisco. Plaintiff cannot recover as an item of incidental 
damage the whole cost of shipping the goods from their location 
at breach (Chicago) to the place of resale (San Francisco) ; account 
must be taken of the shipping costs saved-from Chicago to 
Detroit. The amount of damages properly allowed is the differ-
ence between freight from Chicago to San Francisco and the 
freight from Chicago to Detroit.96 
Where plaintiff is obligated to mitigate by resale, but he does 
not do so before trial, his damages are calculated as if he had. In 
computing the value to him of what he saved the court should take 
into account the extra expenses that would have been involved in 
the process of mitigation. For example, if plaintiff should have 
mitigated in the example above by reselling in San Francisco and 
he utterly failed to mitigate, the value to him of what he saved is 
the price the goods would have brought in San Francisco, reduced 
by the difference between freight to San Francisco and freight to 
Detroit. 
The extra freight involved in resale in San Francisco should be 
taken into account now not because it is an item of incidental 
95 See Willhelm Lubrication v. Brattrud, 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634 (1936); Lake 
County Pine Lumber Co. v. Underwood Lumber Co., 140 Ore. 19, 12 P.2d 324 (1932); 
Margaret Mill v. Aycock Hosiery Mills, 20 Tenn. App. 533, 101 S.W.2d 154 (1936) ; 5 
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1036 (1951) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 142, at 585 (1935) ; RESTATE• 
MENT, CONTRACTS § 333, comment f (1932) . 
96 Cf. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243 (1924); Simons v. Ypsilanti Paper Co., 77 
Mich. 185, 43 N.W. 864 (1889) ; Reading Co. v. Aronsky, 19 Leh. County L.J. 320 (Pa, 
Ct. C.P. 1941) • 
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damages; it is not; but because it is relevant if plaintiff's oppor-
tunity to achieve a savings is to be measured accurately. Of course, 
if the item in question is not proved with certainty the court must 
disregard it,97 but it is possible to prove the item although it was 
not in fact incurred before trial. In other words, where such an 
extra expense is actually incurred, there are two reasons for taking 
it into account-because it bears on what plaintiff saved, and 
because it is an item of incidental damage-and the court must 
exercise care to avoid double counting. Where such extra expense 
is not actually incurred, there is only one reason for taking it into 
account-to measure accurately what the plaintiff should have 
saved-and the court must exercise care lest it fallaciously ignore 
the item.98 
2. Burden of Proof in General 
There remains the question of which party should have the 
burden of proving the potential resale value of the goods by 
reference to actual comparable sales. Since plaintiff has the choice 
of remedies-price, foreclosure, damages-there is some peril in 
giving defendant the burden of proving values. Plaintiff, where 
proof of value is hard to produce, would always elect the damage 
remedy if defendant had the burden of proof; if defendant failed 
to carry the burden plaintiff would retain the goods and recover 
the unpaid balance of the price without deducting anything to 
reflect the value of the goods retained. It is better to solve the 
problem by placing the burden of proof on plaintiff. 
3. Problems of Lost Volume 
a. When does resale impair volume'! Corbin's discussion of 
the expansible seller as plaintiff,99 which was quoted earlier, 
identifies a familiar problem in the cases involving saved per-
sonalty: one of the extra expenses of actual or potential mitigation 
by resale in some cases is an impairment of plaintiff's total volume 
of sales. If plaintiff, upon defendant's rejection of the goods, 
should resell them to the first customer who comes along after the 
breach, and plaintiff othenvise would have sold other goods to 
07 E.g., Demari, Inc. v. John B. Cabot, Inc., 273 App. Div. 717, 98 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1948); 
Columbia Produce Co. v. Tiskowitz, 134 Pa. Super. 145, 3 A.2d 990 (1938) . 
98 Cf. McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 182, at 696 (1935) • 
90 See text at note 23 supra. 
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that customer, the resale has "cost" plaintiff the sale of those other 
goods. This invisible cost will be present whether the contract 
with defendant called for the sale of specified personalty or 
personalty that was only generally described in the contract. And 
it will be present whether or not plaintiff has special channels open 
with his supplier. 
Three conditions, however, must be met before the phenome-
non occurs. First, at the time of the breach, plaintiff must have 
had the intention of maximizing his sales volume. If he lacked 
such intent the resale did not cause a reduction of his total volume 
since he never intended to sell other goods to the customer who, 
because of defendant's breach and the consequent resale, took the 
goods defendant rejected. Whether or not plaintiff had such an 
intent normally can be ascertained by proof of whether plaintiff 
was a commercial seller of the personalty in question. If he was a 
commercial seller, and if the sale was in the ordinary course of 
business, plaintiff probably intended to maximize his volume. 
Otherwise, it is safe to presume that he did not intend to maximize 
his volume. 
The second condition concerns plaintiff's physical capacity to 
perform both his original contract with defendant and another, 
similar contract with the first customer who comes along after 
defendant's breach. If plaintiff lacked this physical ability (and 
could not have performed with the other customer but for the 
breach), his failure to sell additional goods to the first customer 
who came along after breach was not caused by the breach and 
resale.100 In resolving this question plaintiff's arrangements with 
his supplier of goods should be scrutinized as should all his 
commercial arrangements which might bear on this ultimate 
question.101 
The last of the three conditions goes to the question whether 
plaintiff should have recaptured (or did recapture) any lost 
volume by some adjustment in his manner of doing business which 
would have increased the demand for his product. For if plaintiff 
either did or should have recaptured his lost volume in this 
100 See Hinckley v. Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co., 121 U.S. 264 (1887); Petrie v. Lane, 
67 Mich. 454, 35 N.W. 70 (1887); Locks v. Wade, 36 N.J. Super. 128, 114 A.2d 875 (1955); 
R.EsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 336, comment c (1932); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 1008 (1952) . 
101 But see ·waters, The Concept of Market in the Sale of Goods, 36 CAN. B. REv. 360 
(1958). 
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fashion the resale cannot be regarded as having cost plaintiff 
the value of the lost volume; it should be regarded as having cost 
plaintiff whatever it would take to adjust his manner of doing 
business in a way that recaptures the lost volume. These re-
adjustments to recapture lost volume might take the form of selling 
at a lower price, selling on terms more favorable to the buyer, 
extending credit to poorer risks, or increasing plaintiff's total 
promotional expenditure. 
Where the change in plaintiff's way of doing business would 
seriously inconvenience him, or might seriously inconvenience 
him, mitigation does not require the change. Courts do not, and 
should not, listen to defendant's suggestions as to possible changes 
plaintiff could have made in his standard business procedures 
unless the proposed change is simple enough that the court feels 
some confidence in its ability to judge whether or not it would 
entail subtle, but real, hardship on plaintiff. Thus it should be 
the rare case where a court seriously entertains the question of 
whether plaintiff should have changed his way of doing business 
in other aspects than lowering his price or increasing his promo-
tional efforts. Even these changes may entail subtle, but real, 
drawbacks that destroy their feasibility. 
Plaintiff should have the burden of proving that he had the 
intent and the ability to maximize his sales volume. He has both 
superior access to this information and the motive to adduce it. 
If he meets the burden of proof on these two conditions, the court 
should presume the existence of the third condition, leaving it to 
defendant to prove that in some fashion, plaintiff either did or 
should have recaptured his lost volume. This burden should be on 
defendant for two reasons: the difficulty of plaintiff's negativing 
the feasibility of all possible schemes for increasing volume, and 
the probability that a commercial seller's self-interest more often 
than not leads him to maximize his volume in all possible ways. 
b. Valuing lost volume. If plaintiff succeeds in proving that 
an invisible cost was the loss of as much volume of business as he 
resold, there remains the problem of proving the value to plaintiff 
of the lost volume. The value to him of lost volume is the 
difference between the receipts that would have been received 
from such additional sales, and the extra costs that would have been 
involved had plaintiff made such additional sales. The price at 
which plaintiff resold, or would have resold, is good evidence of the 
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receipts he would have received from such additional sales. But 
there is more difficulty in measuring what it would have cost 
plaintiff to have made such additional sales. 
Calculation of the variable costs that would have gone into such 
additional sales is not too difficult; it is the overhead costs that give 
difficulty. If plaintiff could have handled the additional sales 
without any increase in his overhead costs, no overhead should be 
taken into account. To the extent overhead would have had to be 
increased it should be regarded in the calculations.102 
c. Burden of proving the value of lost volume. Plaintiff should 
have the burden of proving the value to him of the lost receipts. 
Defendant should have the burden of proving the saved costs. The 
rationale for this allocation is identical to the rationale for 
handling overhead problems, discussed earlier at pages 590-92. 
Were these rules accepted by a court, a plaintiff dealer suing a 
customer who wrongfully refused to accept delivery would be well-
advised to prove the following items during his case in chief: (1) 
the unpaid balance of the price; (2) the price he did get or could 
have gotten by resale of the rejected goods to another consumer; 
(3) his intent to maximize his volume; (4) his ability to obtain 
other goods like the ones defendant rejected for resale to the first 
customer who came along after the breach; and (5) other 
("visible") extra expenses of mitigation by resale. 
Defendant would be well-advised to offer proof of (I) the 
variable costs plaintiff saved on the original deal by virtue of the 
breach, and (2) the total cost to plaintiff of an additional unit of 
volume. 
d. Lost volume treatment illustrated. Plaintiff is a car dealer 
who contracted to deliver a new car to defendant buyer at a price 
of $3,000, of which $100 was paid at the time of contracting. When 
plaintiff tendered delivery of the car defendant wrongfully refused 
to accept it. Plaintiff thereupon sued for damages after having 
resold the car to another customer for $3,000. The basic measure-
ment formula consists of the value to plaintiff of what defendant 
failed to do less the value to plaintiff of what he saved, plus 
incidental expenses caused by the breach. 
102 Problems here are parallel to those discussed at pp. 588-92 supra. 
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What defendant failed to do was pay the balance of the price. 
That sum, $2,900, is our first term. What plaintiff saved consists 
of two items at most: goods on hand at breach (the car) and 
variable costs yet to be incurred. Since breach was not anticipatory 
no variable costs were saved. The value to plaintiff of the saved 
car is determined by the car's resale value with adjustments. 
Whether we use actual or potential gross resale price the resale 
value is $3,000 before adjustments. 
The first adjustment is subtraction from $3,000 of all the 
visible extra expenses involved in reselling the car. "Extra ex-
penses" are those in excess of the expenses plaintiff would have 
incurred had he completed performance with defendant. Let us 
assume that the variable cost items involved in the resale are (1) 
the cost of a credit check on the new buyer-$50-and (2) the 
commission of the salesman who closed the deal with him-$300. 
Both items are "extra" since they would not have been incurred to 
sell this car, but for the breach. These two items must be sub-
tracted from $3,000 to give the value to plaintiff of the car he 
saved. 
Moreover, if it appears plaintiff's resale of this car cost him 
another car's sale, the $3,000 figure (value of what plaintiff saved) 
must be further reduced by the value to plaintiff of this invisible 
extra expense of resale. This figure consists of the difference 
between the potential receipts of another unit of volume-$3,000 
-and the potential expenses of such an additional sale. If 
plaintiff's total variable costs involved in another sale (including 
the cost of acquiring the car from the manufacturer) are $2,500, 
and fixed costs are ignored, the value to plaintiff of the lost unit 
of volume is $3,000 less $2,500, or $500. 
Thus, plaintiff's savings from the breach consist of the value of 
saved goods on hand ($3,000) reduced by the visible costs of 
resale, i.e., the cost of a credit check ($50) and saleman's com-
mission ($300) and further reduced by the invisible costs of resale, 
i.e., the difference between the resale price of the car ($3,000) 
and the total variable costs of reselling such a car ($2,500) . 
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In tabular form the formula appears thus: 
Unpaid balance of the price 
Less savings from breach: 
$2,900 
Saved goods on hand 
Less extra costs of resale: 
Visible: 
Credit check 
Sales commission 
Total visible costs 
Invisible: 
$50 
300 
Receipts from potential sale $3,000 
Less costs of resale 2,500 
Total invisible costs 
Total extra costs of resale 
Total savings from breach 
Plaintiff's recovery 
$350 
500 
$3,000 
850 
$2,150 
$750 
In linear terms this would be: 
$2,900-[[$3,000-($350 + ($3,000-$2,500)] ]] or 
$2,900-[[$3,000-($350 + $500] ]] or 
$2,900-$2,150 = $750. 
The figures in double brackets represent the value to plaintiff 
of what he saved. The figures in single brackets represent the total 
extra expense of resale. The figures in parentheses represent the 
invisible extra expense of resale-the value to plaintiff of the loss 
of one unit of volume. 
The resale price of the car figures in the equation twice, once as 
the value to plaintiff of saved goods on hand before adjustment, and 
once as the minuend in a subtraction designed to fix the value to 
plaintiff of the volume impaired by resale. Algebraic cancellation 
of these two items permits the formula to be condensed thus: 
unpaid balance of the price plus the visible extra expenses of 
resale minus the variable costs of selling one more car. This works 
out as $2,900 plus $350 minus $2,500. 
If the breach was anticipatory, the formula becomes more 
complex. Within the double brackets and outside the single 
brackets will go a new positive term:· variable costs saved. For 
example, if the breach occurred after the car was on hand but 
before plaintiff had completed his work of preparing it for 
customer delivery, variable cost items in the preparation process 
would be introduced into the formula. 
If the breach occurred before plaintiff was obligated to the 
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manufacturer to accept delivery of the car, "saved goods on hand" 
do not enter the picture; only saved variable costs need to be 
taken into account. In this case the formula should read thus: 
unpaid balance of the price ($2,900) minus saved variable costs-
all variable costs of an average sale ($2,500) less the two items not 
saved, the credit check ($50) and the salesman's commission 
($300) . Thus the formula, in dollar terms, is $2,900-$2,150, or 
$750. 
F. Non-Delegable Services 
I. Valuation Problems 
The saved "time" of persons who cannot delegate their duty of 
rendering services cannot be valued at cost of replacement; it must 
be valued by reference to its actual or potential resale price. It 
must be valued at the higher of these two figures, actual resale 
price or the price at which plaintiff could have resold his time by 
reasonable effort to find the top-paying job which did not entail 
undue risk or self-sacrificing. 
If the potential resale price-what plaintiff could have earned 
by reselling these non-delegable services elsewhere without undue 
self-sacrifice-is higher than the actual resale price, mitigation 
notions require that potential resale price be used. If actual resale 
price is the higher-because the services were resold in a fashion 
not required by mitigation notions-the actual resale price must 
be used to satisfy the doctrinal requirement that breach-caused 
gains to be taken into account. A similar interplay of the notions 
of "mitigation" and "breach-caused gain" in a different context 
was discussed previously.103 
Three specific issues emerge: (I) what did plaintiff in fact earn 
by resale of his released time? (2) if plaintiff had used reasonable 
efforts to find the top-paying job which did not entail too much 
self-sacrifice or risk on his part, would he have found a job? (3) if 
the prior answer was affirmative, what would the job have paid? 
2. Burden of Proof 
On the first issue once again a situation emerges where plaintiff 
has superior access to the evidence, and defendant is the only 
person motivated to bring the evidence forward. For the reasons 
103 See discussion at note 36 supra. And see discussion at pp. 607-08 infra. 
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given in the discussion of overhead the burden should fall on 
defendant in such a situation. 
On the last two issues the parties are equal in their access to 
the information and defendant is the only party motivated to 
bring forward the information. The burden of proving these 
items should thus fall on him: 
II. PLAINTIFF'S SAVINGS VALUED AS AN ENTITY 
In rare instances plaintiff's "duty to mitigate" damages requires 
that, upon notice of defendant's total breach, plaintiff not stop 
work on the contract. Rather, he should complete fabrication and 
resell the completed entity to some buyer other than defendant. 
In these instances what plaintiff saved should be valued as an 
"entity"-at the price the completed performance would bring 
upon resale. The determination of when the "entity" approach to 
valuatiop. is appropriate is best considered in the light of specific 
contexts. 
Illustration 1. Plaintiff-manufacturer agreed to fabricate and 
deliver clocks to defendant-buyer's specifications. Defendant repu-
diated at a point where plaintiff had no clocks finished, many in 
process, and much special raw material on hand. Should the court 
value what plaintiff saved by reference to the price the clocks 
would bring on the market if plaintiff completed fabrication after 
notice of breach? Or is the better reference to the sum of the 
values of the various components of plaintiff's as yet unrendered 
performance: his as yet unincurred expenses for more raw 
materials, his ability to divert his overhead facilities to other work, 
his ability to sell the raw materials as raw materials and to sell the 
unfinished clocks as scrap? 
Illustration 2. Plaintiff publishes a magazine, and agreed to 
design, set up and run weekly advertisements for defendant for 
fifty-two weeks. After two weeks defendant repudiated. Should 
the court value plaintiff's savings by reference to the resale value of 
the entity-the space in the magazine which the ad would have 
filled-or by reference to the components of plaintiff's performance 
as yet unapplied to the contract when plaintiff learned of the 
repudiation-his variable costs still unincurred on the rest of the 
contract? 
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A. Application of the Entity Approach 
The choice must be made with regard both to the mitigation 
notion and to the notion that breach-caused gains are to be taken 
into account whether or not mitigation obligated the plaintiff to 
take the risks involved in making such gains. Four basic situations 
can arise: (I) upon notice of breach plaintiff completes the process 
of fabrication and resells the entity to a new buyer, and at trial 
he wants his savings measured by reference to the resale value of 
the entity; (2) upon notice of breach plaintiff does not complete 
the process of fabrication and at trial he resists defendant's efforts 
to measure plaintiff's opportunity to save by reference to the 
probable resale value of the entity; (3) upon notice of breach 
plaintiff does not complete fabrication and resale of the entity, but 
at trial he wants to value his savings by reference to the potential 
resale price of the entity rather than by reference to his saved 
components of performance; (4) upon notice of breach plaintiff 
completes fabrication and resells the entity, but at trial he resists 
defendant's efforts to value the savings by reference to the resale 
receipts actually gleaned, arguing for valuation by reference to 
the components as they stood when notice of breach was received. 
In the first two situations, if defendant raises no objection to 
plaintiff's valuation technique the court should raise none. If 
defendant objects, defendant should have the burden of proving 
that the notion of mitigation obligated plaintiff to take the opposite 
course from that which he in fact took. Defendant should be 
obligated to prove not only that in the light of hindsight the 
plaintiff's alternative course of action would have resulted in lower 
damages, but also that plaintiff should have known this at the time 
he exercised his choice. The burden should be placed on 
defendant, rather than plaintiff, because it is more likely than not 
that plaintiff's self-interest will lead him to use reasonable self-
protective care upon breach. It is the rare plaintiff who is so sure 
he will later prevail at trial that he is careless of present loss. By 
putting the burden of proof on defendant the court increases the 
likelihood that the result reached in cases where the burden is not 
carried will correspond to the true state of facts. 
Even if defendant carries the burden of proof described above, 
plaintiff should be permitted to rebut by showing that the course 
advocated now by defendant, although more economical, would 
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have been impractical or perilous for plaintiff for valid commercial 
or personal reasons. Plaintiff should have the burden of showing 
such reasons since defendant cannot anticipate and negative all 
possible reasons of this sort. 
In the last two situations, where plaintiff wants his savings 
valued in a fashion different from the course of action which he 
actually took upon notice of breach, if defendant has no objection, 
the court should have none. However, if defendant insists upon 
valuing plaintiff's savings by reference to the course of action 
actually pursued by plaintiff the court should sustain defendant's 
objection. The plaintiff's objection to reference to his actual course 
of action must rest on the fallacious argument that inasmuch as he 
was not obligated to take the course he took (which turned out to 
be very effective in mitigating the effects of breach) , the court should 
not "penalize" him by subtracting his actual savings thus achieved at 
his own risk. The fallacy of plaintiff's position has been noted 
before: defendant's position does not rest on the mitigation notion, 
but on a separate principle-that plaintiff's breach-caused gains 
be taken into account. 
B. Valuation of the Entity 
It is the rare case in which (a) entity valuation of what plaintiff 
saved will give a different answer from separate valuation of each 
component and (b) entity valuation is appropriate. In those rare 
instances, however, problems of valuation of the entity should be 
handled in the same way as similar problems of valuation of goods 
or choses on hand. The entity thus will be valued by reference to 
its resale value, adjusted to reflect incidental damages and reduc-
tion in plaintiff's total volume. 
C. Timing of the Decision To Use the Entity Approach 
In the bulk of cases, neither counsel raises the possibility of 
using an entity approach to valuation. In some cases both counsel 
assume without question that an entity approach will be used. 
But in the fairly rare case in which counsel disagree as to whether 
the entity or the components approach is appropriate, it is most de-
sirable to resolve that question before the actual trial begins. If re-
solution of that question is postponed until after all the evidence is 
in, each counsel must guess, before and during trial, which approach 
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the tribunal will take. Counsel therefore faces this unhappy choice: 
offer proof in the alternative-with the confusion and extra 
preparation which that involves-or take a guess, with the chance 
that the case will be lost because he guessed wrong. Moreover, if 
the issue is not resolved before trial, there is the chance that at 
least one attorney will overlook the possibility that this issue might 
arise, and will assume erroneously, but with confidence, that a 
components approach will be used. 
Everything said thus far argues for pretrial resolution of the 
question. But our procedural habits restrict our ability to resolve 
such questions before the start of trial. The hallowed way of 
resolving such questions before trial is -by giving one party an 
option, and deeming him to have exercised it by the way he pleads 
or fails to plead. Our question, however, should not be left to the 
option of either party. It should be resolved by agreement of the 
parties-if they can be brought to agree-or by an order of the 
tribunal according to the rules suggested in the previous section. 
The appropriate time for such an agreement or ruling is at a 
pretrial conference of the trial judge and trial counsel, held 
sufficiently late in the pretrial history of the case that counsel will 
know their facts, but sufficiently in advance of trial that counsel 
may adjust their trial preparations to take the ruling into account. 
Judges would be well-advised, wherever possible, to pre-try at 
least the damage issue of every contract case in which either the 
court or one counsel evidences a desire to resolve before trial the 
question of entity or components valuation. Of course, the pretrial 
conference cannot resolve legal questions which turn on disputed 
facts if counsel cannot agree sufficiently on the resolution of these 
disputes. In such cases, resolution of the entity-components ques-
tion must await the end of the fact-finding process. But even in 
these instances where pretrial fails to bring about a resolution of 
this question, it will at least serve to alert counsel to the risks they 
run on this issue, and, if the pretrial judge is also the trial judge, 
it will serve to educate him on the issue. 
Where this matter cannot be resolved until fact-finding is 
completed, the fact-finding upon which it depends should be done 
by the court, not the jury, even in jury cases. The choice between 
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entity and component valuation should be categorized as a "ques-
tion of law." To submit it to the jury, with complex instructions 
as to its resolution and an additional set of alternative instructions 
as to how the jury should proceed after it resolves this question, 
is to guarantee confusion. 
